Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Slingshot Argument, philosophy: slingshot argument is an expression for a problematic conclusion from the assumption originally made by G. Frege that the meaning of sentences is their truth value. That is, true sentences mean, according to Frege, the truth. If you replace individual expressions of a statement with expressions that have the same extension (reference object), the truth value does not change. However, in the case of piecewise substitution, the meaning can change and finally also the truth value. See also extension, truths values, reference, co-extension, great fact, fulfillment, consequences._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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John R. Searle on Slingshot Argument - Dictionary of Arguments
III 229ff Slingshot Argument/Searle: the slingshot argument originates from Frege; it was used by Quine against the modal logic and revived by Davidson against the correspondence theory. III 230 If a true statement corresponds to a fact, then it corresponds to any fact, hence the notion of correspondence is completely empty. The proposition that snow is white, corresponds to the fact that grass is green. Analysis: there is a difference between co-referential singular terms and equivalent sentences, e.g. "x is identical with Diogenes and snow is white". III 231 Solution/Searle: 1. There is irrelevance: "...Diogenes", 2. Logical equivalence of sentences does not mean identity of the relevant facts. Conclusion/Searle: the slingshot argument does not refute the correspondence theory. >Correspondence theory, >facts. III 230 Step 1: The statement that snow is white corresponds to the fact that snow is white. Step 2: a) The whole statement remains true when replacing co-referential singular terms. b) The whole statement remains true when replacing logically equivalent sentences. (Def logically equivalent: in each model the same truth value). Step 3: we assume: the sentence a) "Snow is white" is logically equivalent to the sentence: b) "The x such that (x is identical to Diogenes) is identical to the x such that (x is identical to Diogenes and snow is white)". Step 4: we assume: the proposition: "grass is green" is logically equivalent to the proposition: "The x such that ( x is identical to Diogenes) is identical to the x such that (x is identical to Diogenes and grass is green). III 231 Step 5: we assume: the expression "the x such that (x is identical to Diogenes and snow is white)" refers to the same object as the expression "the x such that (x is identical to Diogenes and grass is green)". Step 6: (is derived from step 1): the statement that snow is white corresponds to the fact that the x such that (x is identical to Diogenes) is identical to the x such that (x is identical to Diogenes and snow is white). (From 2b) Step 7: (from 2a together with the reference from 5): the statement that snow is white corresponds to the fact that the x such that (x is identical to Diogenes) is identical to the x such that (x is identical to Diogenes and grass is green). Step 8: (from 2b): the statement that snow is white corresponds to the fact that grass is green. SearleVsSlingshot Argument: an argument of this kind can at most show the falseness of its assumptions. These are contraintuitive consequences. III 232 Irrelevance: the statement that snow is white does not correspond to any fact concerning Diogenes. Even Diogenes' own identity (or the fact that 2+2 = 4) has nothing to do with what makes the statement that snow is white true. Correspondence theory: some authors accuse her of petitio principii. III 233 The accusation may be returned. It is a petitio principii to assume to the correspondence theory that it is subject to principles like 2b, if no argument for the applicability of this principle is given. Logical equivalence: the substitutability of logically equivalent propositions does not mean identity of facts! Example "The statement that a corresponds to the fact that b". Here one can replace b by c only if: the fact that b, is identical to the fact that c. Intensionality/Searle: the expression: "The fact that ...." is completely non-extensional. (In contrast, "X corresponds Y" is completely extensional). "The fact that..." does not preserve the selfhood of the reference by replacing logically equivalent propositions. But why should you? Why should facts concerning snow be identical to facts concerning Diogenes or anyone else? III 235 Slingshot argument: Searle: conclusion: it does not refute the correspondence theory._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Slingshot Argument
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28